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discontinued. When plaintiff subsequently brought suit in a second
court on the same cause of action, defendant moved to dismiss on
the ground of the "pendency" of the prior action. 56 The court
equated the withdrawal of the moving papers to the situation which
results after the service of a summons without a complaint, and
held that since the summary judgment motion was not denied
in
5 7
the first action, the affidavit did not become the complaint.
The main problem in the instant case was whether the stipulated withdrawal served to effectively terminate the first cause of
action. If so, the second action could proceed directly to judgment.
The court found that the summons from the first action was still
outstanding, and stayed its own action pending disposition of the
prior litigation. However, it did not decide whether an outstanding
summons was sufficient to constitute a prior pending action under
CPLR 3211(a) (4).
It has been held, for the purposes of CPLR 3211(a) (4), that
a summons alone will not bar future proceedings "as the party
might, in his declaration, count upon an entirely different cause of
action." 15s However, this reasoning may n6t be applicable to the situation presented in the instant case. Here, the court could examine the
moving papers from the first action to determine whether the two
actions were identical. If so, the court might dismiss the second
action on the basis of a prior pending action. If not, the court
would order that the second action proceed to judgment.
Pursuant to the disposition here, plaintiff can move in the
original court for a voluntary discontinuance' 59 or other clarification
of the first action's status. If it is determined that the first action
is no longer pending, plaintiff can bring that clarification to the
attention of the second court, move to vacate the latter's stay, and
proceed with the second action.
CPLR 3216: Forty-five day demand held condition precedent to
a 3216 motion.
The controversy revolving about the forty-five day notice
requirement of the 1964 amendment to CPLR 3216 appears finally
to have been resolved. In Salama v. Cohen, 60 a memorandum
156

CPLR 3211 (a) (4).

v. Schuster, 47 Misc. 2d 782, 783, 263 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (Dist
Ct. Nassau County 1965).
1'8 Louis R. Shapiro, Inc. v. Milspemes Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 857, 248
N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (1st Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision) ; see 7B McKiNxEy's
S57Reiche

CPLR 3211, supp. commentary 96, 97 (1964).
159 CPLR 3217. It is not clear, however, if plaintiff could discontinue the
first action by mere notice to the defendant (CPLR 3217(a) (1)) or whether
he was required to obtain a court order for discontinuance (CPLR 3217(b)).
This would depend upon whether plaintiff had (by way of the since withdrawn
moving papers) asserted a claim in the first action, which question was not
resolved by the instant case.
10 154 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1965, p. 16, col. 1.
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opinion, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously held that
before a 3216 motion to dismiss will be considered, defendant must
first serve a written demand upon plaintiff to serve and file a note
of issue within forty-five days. Although this would seem necessarily
to mean that all plaintiffs are now entitled to a forty-five day grace
period in which to revive a stagnant claim, practitioners in the first
department are cautioned against assuming that plaintiff's rights
are so protected. Previous attempts, by both the legislature and
the Court of Appeals, to provide safeguards against neglect-toprosecute dismissals, have not had, at least in the first department,
the pervasive effect that many assumed they would. Developments
of the past might shed some light on the future of CPLR 3216.
The attention that has been drawn to the dismissal for neglect
to prosecute was originated by the first department in Sortino v.
Fisher.261 Disturbed by the overburdening of its calendar with
stale and immobile claims, the court sought to clear away stagnant
litigation by expanding the accessability of this motion to defendants. In Sortino, the first department carefully re-examined the
excuses for delay in prosecution that plaintiffs had been successfully
employing to resist defendants' motions to dismiss. It discarded
some as patently insufficient and severely limited the operation of
those remaining. 6 2 It had been previously recognized that a dismissal for failure to prosecute by the appellate division "involves
a pure question of discretion of the type not reviewable by the
Court of Appeals." 163 Therefore, when confronted by the flood of
3216 dismissals throughout the state following Sortino,64 plaintiffs
turned to the legislature for assistance. This resulted (only months
after Sortino) in the enactment of the 1964 (Volker) amendment
to CPLR 3216, which, although providing other benefits to plaintiffs,
became widely renowned for its requirement of a forty-five day
demand before any dismissal for failure to file a note of issue could
be entertained. It was assumed that this would assure plaintiff
a grace period in which, by filing a note of issue,66he could avoid
6 7
65
However, in the Mulinos' and Brown
CPLR 3216 entirely.
1-20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).
162 See 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 169, 170-73 (1964)
for an extensive discussion and evaluation of the Sortino case; A Biannual
Survey of Krew York Practice, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 406, 448-52 (1964).
163 Miranda v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.2d 883, 179 N.E.2d 512, 223
N.Y.S.2d 509 (1961).
110 E.g., Rockwell v. Locker, 20 App. Div. 2d 722, 247 N.Y.S.2d 554 (2d
Dep't 1964); Dawkins v. Mandelson, 20 App. Div. 2d 713, 247 N.Y.S.2d 348

(2d Dep't 1964).
13 7B McKixNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 160, 161 (1965).
166 Mulinos v. Coliseum Constr. Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 163, 254 N.Y.S.2d

282 (1st Dep't 1964).
167B3rown v. Weissberg, 22 App. Div. 2d 282, 254 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1st
Dep't 1964).
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cases, the first department clearly indicated that it would not be so
easily deterred from the strict policy toward lethargic plaintiffs it
had so carefully outlined in Sortino. The court in Mulinos held
that by relying for dismissal upon "general delay" (apparently
delay in the performance of those acts required preparatory to filing
a note of issue), rather than failure to file, defendant would not
have to serve a forty-five day demand.'" The Court of Appeals
reversed this "general delay" dismissal on the ground that the
appellate division lacked the power to dismiss for failure to file a
note of issue 'unless CPLR 3216, as amended, was complied with?"
The brevity and ambiguity of the opinion, however, enabled the
first department
to find that this case was consistent with its prior
170
holdings.

The second department, which prior to the amendment had
followed Sortino,7 tacitly indicated its opposition to the construction of the first department,1 7 2 and a few lower courts in the second
department have specifically and emphatically registered their dissent. 7 3 The fourth department has been silent on the issue and one
trial court
in the third department has adopted the first department's
17 4
view.

Although Salama would seem to terminate all dispute, its
language, by a hypertechnical reading, permits one possible avenue
of avoidance. That is, after the forty-five day period has lapsed,
defendant might still move for dismissal based on general delay,
notwithstanding plaintiff's filing of a note of issue within that period.
However unlikely such a construction would be, the practitioner
should at least be aware of its possible occurrence.
Were it not for the fact that the first department's construction
of CPLR 3216 appears to be contrary to that of the Court of
Appeals, and opposed to the intent of the legislature in amending
this rule, the position taken by the first department would have
much substantive merit. Even were plaintiff not entitled to the
1- Mulinos v. Coliseum Constr. Corp., supra note 166, at 164, 254 N.Y.S.2d
at 283; see Weeks v. Janowitz, 23 App. Div. 2d 549, 256 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st
Dep't 1965); Rutigliano v. Richter, 23 App. Div. 2d 489, 255 N.Y.S.2d
741 (1st Dep't 1965).
19 Fischer v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 725, 209 N.E.2d
725, 262 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1965).
170 Roberts v. New York Post Corp., (1st Dep't), 154 N.Y.LJ. Oct. 1, 1965,
p. 15, col. 7.
171 See cases cited note 164 supra.
172E.g., McLoughlin v. Weiss, 23 App. Div. 2d 881, 259 N.Y.S.2d 941
(2d Dep't 1965); Dooley v. Gray, 22 App. Div. 2d 791, 253 N.Y.S2d 808
(2d Dep't 1964).
173 See, e.g., Kalning v. New York Cent. R.R., 45 Misc. 2d 1036, 258
N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965); DeVita v. Metropolitan Dist.,
Inc., 45 Misc. 2d 761, 257 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1965).
174 New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co., 47 Misc. 2d 951,
263 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct Ulster County 1965).
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forty-five day demand, he would nevertheless be immunized from
a CPLR 3216 motion during the six months subsequent to joinder
by virtue of the same amendment that furnished the forty-five day
demand.
There are several explanations for delay which the courts will
accept to overcome the motion and a strong showing of merit may
also suffice as a valid defense.17 5 Pursuant to the apparent meaning
of Salama, and the more explicit statements of a few trial courts in
the second department,1 76 plaintiff is encouraged to rest upon his
rights for so long as he might choose-even years past the expiration of the statute of limitations-and still be entitled to forty-five
days to revive his claim.
CPLR 3216: Dismissal held available against third-party plaintiff.
In New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co.,

77

appar-

ently the only reported post-amendment third department case to
consider the failure-to-prosecute dismissal, the Ulster County
Supreme Court granted a third-party defendant's 3216 motion to
dismiss the third-party claim. The court refused to consider the
motion for its application to the plaintiff's main action, stating:
The third-party plaintiff by commencing the third-party action, interjected
itself as an aggressor plaintiff party and assumed the duties and responsibilities
of a plaintiff in pressing its action. It had the right to bring motions for
If a delay was avoidable, it is no excuse
dismissal under CPLR 3216 ....
to lay it at the door of the plaintiff in the main action. The third-party
or lack of activity and must justify the
plaintiff stands on his own activity 78
delay with some reasonable excuse.'

The court stated (following the first department holdings alluded
to above) that since the dismissal was based upon general delay,
the forty-five day demand was unnecessary.
Although the Salama case would now seem to require the
forty-five day demand, the disposition of the instant case is nonetheless difficult to justify.
Since impleader in New York is available only for indemnity,
it seems inappropriate to lay the burden of prosecution on the
third-party plaintiff, even as to the third-party claim. In that claim,
defendant (third-party plaintiff) is seeking only to be made whole
for whatever the main plaintiff recovers from him. If the main
claim is delayed-and Sortino and its progeny provides that the
175Giordano v. St Clare's Hospital, 24 App. Div. 2d 568, 262 N.Y.S.2d 61
(2d Dep't 1965). Contra, New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co.,

supra note 174.

176 See cases cited note 173 supra.

177 Supra note 174.
178 New Paltz Growers, Inc. v. Jersey Ice Mach. Co., supra note 174,
at 953, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 474.

